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Abstract—Contextual privacy is an essential concept in social
software communication. Managing privacy in social software
strongly depends on the context to avoid misappropriation of
data. The sheer amount of data and large audiences make
context control complex. Current contextual privacy management
approaches can be either too complex to use, or too simple
to offer fine-grained control. In many cases, it is challenging
to strike a balance between effective control and ease-of-use.
Moreover, current approaches are insufficient to mitigate data
misappropriation attacks. In this article, we analyse contextual
privacy in relation to context and communication. We examine
a relevant contextual privacy management framework based
on the maintenance of the interpretation of data. We propose
an architecture based on the utilisation of artificial intelligence
mechanisms. We conceptually analyse the usability aspects of the
proposed architecture, and present how the framework enhances
communication and privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The surge of social software is associated with increasing
complexity of managing privacy. People disclose their data
to socialise and communicate with others. By a data disclo-
sure, a user expresses a particular communicative message. A
message can be communicated to large audiences. Through
such communication, the user builds a desired online identity.
When a user discloses data, the user controls who can view it
to mitigate privacy concerns. However, with the sheer amount
of data disclosure, and the mix of audiences in social software,
data misappropriation concerns emerge. Data misappropriation
can be illustrated in the following scenario:
Scenario 1 Some Facebook users suffered from privacy violations
by the misappropriation of their profile photos—that are by default
public—in the incident of ‘prostitutes of Antwerp’ [1]. Profile photos
of girls were put in a page entitled ‘prostitutes of city of Antwerp’.
The possible interpretation in the new context negatively affected
the identity of the girls and counted as a privacy violation and was
reported to the authorities as well as Facebook [1]
The scenario demonstrates how misappropriation can occur
in private and public spaces. Private spaces are those in which
accessibility is limited to a specific set of audience. The
audience are trusted not to disseminate the data. However,
a member can act adversarially and misappropriate the data
if the data owner is not able to limit dissemination in all
possible inappropriate contexts. Misappropriation can occur
when a data item is shared publicly because the user has no
means to fully control data dissemination. Problems of dis-
semination control emerge from insufficient degree of control
over context [2].
Misappropriation of data is a particular class of attacks
that current privacy management approaches do not fully
address. Misappropriation of data is the result of any act
that changes the context of data to an inappropriate context.
Traditionally, attacker models focus on actions that change
the information and knowledge state of the attacker. However,
a misappropriation attacker model focuses on achieving an
inappropriate state of the data. Countering such an attack is not
possible currently because privacy management approaches
aim at only prohibiting or allowing particular actions, but they
do not focus on assessing the appropriateness of data after an
action. To address such an attack, we need to include means
to assess the appropriateness of data without burdening users.
We propose utilising artificial intelligence to assist users [3]
through a previously proposed framework for contextual pri-
vacy for social software (CPS2) [4]. The framework offers
privacy management through managing the interpretation of
data. This article contributes the following:
1) An analysis of context control issues, and the attacker
model of misappropriation (Section II)
2) An analysis of contextual privacy concepts (Section III)
3) An architecture design for CPS2, a discussion of a
possible implementation using deep learning, and a
conceptual analysis of the framework usability aspects
(Section IV).
4) A discussion of how the proposed framework can be
applied to enhance privacy and communication (Sec-
tion V).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section discusses the problem of managing privacy by
controlling context, and presents the attacker model.
A. Issues of Context Control
Managing privacy and mitigating misappropriation of data
requires a high degree of context control. From a ‘privacy as
control’ point of view [5], privacy is achievable through con-
trolling the data and the context wherein data is put. However,
most privacy management approaches offer limited control
over the disclosure context [2]. Mitigating misappropriation
requires prohibiting data dissemination in inappropriate con-
texts. Such mitigation requires specifying the set of appropriate
and inappropriate contexts. This specification is infeasible due
to the theoretically infinite number of contexts [4].
Simplified means of contextual privacy management are
insufficient to mitigate data misappropriation [6]. To avoid the
complexity of context control, most approaches adopt simple
means of context control. The simplification is achieved by
capturing context by a few parameters [6], such as roles of
users [7], location or time [8]. This results in offering limited
control over the disclosure context, and a lower degree of
control over dissemination context [2]. Consequently, users
cannot control every change of the contexts their data is in
to avoid inappropriate changes. When context changes, the
sensitivity of data may increase, and thus, the data owner
may incur privacy violations. Controlling context change is
even more challenging when context is unclear. Social soft-
ware contexts can possibly be ambiguous due to the mix of
audiences and data [9]. In such situations, it may not be
possible to assess the sensitivity and the appropriateness of
data. Incorrect assessment of appropriateness can even result
in an unintentional misappropriation attack. Current privacy
management approaches are not sufficient to counter this
attack, whether it is intentional or not, due to the complexity
of controlling context.
B. Attacker Model
A misappropriation attack is achieved by any act that affects
the user’s communicative message, according to the following
model:
• A (trusted) system: is the social software system that
facilities social communication functions. The system
enforces users’ privacy policies and allows actions that
are not prohibited otherwise by the data owner.
• A data owner: is the user who discloses a data item to
communicate a message and is targeted by the attacker
• An attacker: is the user who can access the data item, and
by performing a particular action, the context changes
and becomes inappropriate for the data of the attacked
user. The change can be achieved by putting the data
in a new context, or by causing the current context to
evolve through an action of adding or removing data
from the context. An example is when Alice posts her
breast-feeding photo in a breast-feeding context, and Bob
(the attacker) changes the context to an adult context by
adding a comment that changes the conversation topic.
In theory, misappropriation attacks can be prevented by
monitoring actions on data. In practice, monitoring and de-
tecting attacks requires complete information about all users’
actions. However, data owners cannot monitor and know all
actions of other users. Given the limited context control and
the incomplete information of data owners, it is required
to integrate artificial intelligence approaches to detect such
attacks. Towards proposing such an approach, an analysis of
the role of context in privacy management and communication
is discussed next .
III. CONTEXTUAL PRIVACY
This section illustrates contextual privacy as a means to
manage the communication context to protect privacy.
A. Context
Context is “any information that can be used to characterise
the situation” [10]. An online context is any information
that can be used to characterise an online situation. The
context implies the topic of communication and possibly
some characteristics of the interlocutors. A context can be
approximated by the set of available informational parameters
in the situation. We refer to those parameters as the context-
approximation parameters (CAP). The inaccessibility of these
parameters hinders the correct approximation of context, and
the context is ambiguous. A situation in social software can
be characterised by a post and a context wherein the post is
put (Fig. 1(a)). The communication context includes the data
surrounding the post, the data owner and an audience.
By controlling context, it is possible to affect the approx-
imation of context and the interpretation of data. Adding or
removing data to context can affect the CAP, and as result
the context changes. Whenever the observer—a member of the
audience—is unaware of this change, there can be discrepancy
between the perceived and the actual context resulting in
ambiguity (Fig. 1(b)). Ambiguity disrupts the interpretation
of the communicated message. By controlling the CAP, the
correct inference of the context can be facilitated.
Context provides the appropriate interpretation in a situ-
ation [11]. The interpretation captures the meaning or the
message, as well as the sensitivity of a data item [12]. A
data item can have a limited set of possible interpretations.
Based on the context, the relevant interpretation can be disam-
biguated [13]. When the post is put in a certain context (we say
‘contextualised’ [14]), the interpretation implicitly reflects that
the post is in that context (Fig. 1(b)). Decontextualisation is the
process of taking a post out of the current context, to where the
interpretation is unavailable [14]. We identify the third process
of moving posts between two contexts as recontextualisation.
Such a process decontextualises a post and contextualises it in
another.
B. Communication in Social Software
In most communication situations, people aim at conveying
a particular message. The successful delivery of the com-
municative message to the audience can affect privacy. To
understand such an effect, we focus on two extreme ends of the
communication spectrum, namely, cooperative and adversarial
communication. These types emphasise the varying roles of
context and privacy, as we discuss in the following.
1) Cooperative Communication: In cooperative communi-
cation, the interlocutors cooperate to understand the meaning
of the communicated message. According to Grice, facili-
tating the inference of a message requires the interlocutors
to cooperate and put an effort to clarify the communication
context [15]. Grice stated that providing true, relevant, and
sufficient amount of information while avoiding ambiguity are
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Figure 1: Context in social software.
key to unambiguous context. In this communication, privacy
concerns are relatively low because context is clear and the
interlocutors trust each other clarify a misinterpretation.
2) Adversarial Communication: Adversarial communica-
tion is characterised by the manipulation of the communicated
message. An interlocutor—the adversary—acts maliciously
and misleads others into misinterpreting the message to dis-
rupt the communication or force others to reveal certain
information [16]. Alternatively, when context is ambiguous,
communication can also become adversarial [17]. In such
communication, users can protect privacy by providing less
information [18], with detrimental consequences on the clarity
of context and the inference of the communicative message.
Such a strategy may result in a misinterpretation of data,
and hence an unintentional adversarial communication, or
an unintintional attack (Scenario 7). In this communication,
privacy concerns are high, the degree of trust is low, and data
interpretation is manipulated.
C. Identity and Privacy
The act of communication is related to expressing a desired
identity [19]. Privacy as control is demonstrated as infor-
mational self-determination and facilitates identity manage-
ment [20]. The communicated message of a user contributes,
in turn, to the identity a user is expressing [21]. The mis-
appropriation attacker aims at affecting the identity of the
attacked user’s. To mitigate the attack, contextual privacy
should guarantee that the communicated message can be
correctly inferred to avoid misinterpretation leading to identity
damage.
IV. MANAGING CONTEXTUAL PRIVACY
The observed interdependence of privacy and communi-
cation in the previous section validates the previous concep-
tualisation of contextual privacy by Sayaf et al. [4]. This
interdependence suggests that by maintaining the interpreta-
tion of a data item, privacy can be maintained. By using the
interpretation to manage contextual privacy, the complexity of
controlling context can also be overcome. Given the limited
possibilities of data interpretation, it is easier for users to
specify the appropriate interpretations, than to specify the ap-
propriate contexts. If it is possible to observe the interpretation
of a post by means of automatic context and interpretation
inference tools, it would be possible for users to have control
over context without having to continuously monitor context
and possible attackers.
A. CPS2: Contextual Privacy Framework for Social Software
The previously proposed framework CPS2 is a conceptual
framework to manage contextual privacy and counter the
misappropriation attack. It assumes that the interpretation in
a specific context is appropriate if the owner allows the
disclosure in this context. CPS2 states that an owner can
specify the appropriate interpretation of her post, and based
on this interpretation, dissemination and context changes can
be controlled automatically, and attacks can be detected.
By specifying the appropriate interpretation, the framework
facilitates the inference of the intended interpretation by the
audience.
B. An Architecture Design for Contextual Privacy Manage-
ment
In this section, we propose an architecture design for CPS2.
The framework lifts the burden of reasoning about context to
the level of the social platform, and proposes three layers to
manage contextual privacy. We present the interaction between
these layers (Fig. 2), and investigate techniques of machine
deep learning to implement inference layers.
1) Context Inference Layer: processes the data of a sit-
uation to approximate the current context within the social
software realm.
2) Interpretation Inference Layer: infers the interpretation
of data, based on the inferred context. Inferring the interpreta-
tion is similar to how a search engine matches a search query
to a document: the document is the context and the query is
the post. The query has a specific interpretation in a document,
based on the popularity of this interpretation, the engine judges
the relevance of the document. Similarly, the interpretation of
a post can be inferred in an online context.
3) Contextual Privacy Management Layer (CPML): fa-
cilitates contextual privacy management by maintaining the
appropriateness of interpretation. This layer can follow two
‘privacy as control’ approaches, access control or account-
ability and auditing approaches [4]. In access control, CPML
allows users to specify the appropriate interpretation of their
posts. CPML verifies any action or change of context to
maintain the appropriateness of the interpretation. Alterna-
tively, without specifying the appropriate interpretation, CPML
notifies the owner when the interpretation changes, following
an accountability and auditing approach. The owner judges the
appropriateness of the new interpretation, and accordingly the
change of context is allowed or prohibited.
The inference layers need to be embedded in the soft-
ware platform. These layers can be implemented by machine
learning models, especially deep machine learning generative
models. Deep learning focuses on computational models for
complex information representation [22]. Generative models
are useful for unsupervised learning with a high number of
parameters [23]. These models are useful in social software
situations because the parameters are many and vary across
users; and because it may not be possible to have context
and interpretation labels during the training phase. Generative
models can learn a joint probability distribution over observ-
able data and labels. This means that it is possible to estimate
the conditional probability P(O|L) and P(L|O), where L is a
label and O is a set of observable data variable. In CPS2, the
observable data is the CAP, and labels are information about
context names and interpretations.
One example of generative models that could be applied for
inferences is the Multimodal Learning with Deep Boltzman
Machine proposed by Srivastava and Salakhutdinov [24]. The
model learns a multimodal data representation to perform
classification and information retrieval tasks. The model clas-
sifies images and tags them; and it can also retrieve images
corresponding to a set of tags. This model can be applied for
context and interpretation inference, and context retrieval. A
post can be classified given CAP to infer the interpretation. It
is also possible to retrieve a context, or a set of CAP given
an interpretation. For instance, given an interpretation—and
possibly a post—the appropriate contexts can be retrieved and
displayed to the user. On top of such a model, CPML can be
implemented as an access control or accountability approach.
C. Conceptual Analysis of Usability
In this section, we present a comparative assessment of the
usability of CPS2 with the conceptual framework ‘Privacy as
Contextual Integrity’ (CI) proposed by Nissenbaum [25].
Usability is an important aspect in achieving the objectives
of privacy management approaches [26]. If an approach is
not easy to use, average users would fail to manage their
privacy. Assessing the usability of an approach is essential
at the design phase. We conceptually analyse the usability of
CPS2 and CI using the‘Security Usability Model’ proposed by
Braz et al. [26] using metrics for usability standards.
In principle, the usability of CPS2 is higher than the
usability of CI. CI addresses the issue of limiting recontextual-
isation of data by controlling four parameters: contexts, actors,
attributes, and transmission principles. CI requires the speci-
fication of the norms including: terms of information flow;
the prevailing contexts and possible sub- and super-contexts;
subjects, senders, recipients; and transmission principles. CI
requires specifying parameters that may be challenging to
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Figure 2: Interaction between layers. Upon adding a post d, CPML
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interpretation inference layer. To infer the interpretation, the context
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by simulating the action. Based on the inferred context, the inter-
pretation layer infers the new interpretation Id. If Id is appropriate
and the context changes, CPML checks the appropriateness of the
interpretations of other posts dx before allowing the action.
specify in advance, e.g., users may not be aware of the
terms of information flow in the system, or they may not be
able to predict how the terms may change over time. CPS2
limits the number of parameters users need to specify. Thus,
CPS2 satisfies most of the metrics to a higher degree than CI
(Table I).
D. Implications for User Interface Design and Engineering
In this work, we foresee three main design aims that
enhance the user interaction experience of social software,
contribute to the usability, and offer better privacy manage-
ment.
• Context change alerts: Users can be alerted when CAP
change. Users will be given the opportunity to prevent
unwanted changes.
• Awareness tools: More generally, users will be made
more aware of how their communication evolves. The
communication owner will be notified of context change
and be given the opportunity to act properly.
• Feedback loops: Users can have the opportunity to pro-
vide feedback to the system (e.g., rate alerts or confirm
blocked audience), thereby generating labels that become
part of the training data and gradually improve the system
recommendations. Over time, social software will refine
how the intended interpretation is concisely presented to
users.
V. APPLYING CPS2
In this section, we present how CPS2 can be applied
in to enhance privacy management while requiring minimal
involvement of users during the following interaction phases
with the software.
Usability Metric Description CPS2 CI
UM1- Minimal Action the amount of action required to achieve the task low high
UM2- Minimal the amount of information the user should have low high
Memory Load in mind to complete the task
UM3-Operability amount of effort required to operate an application low high
UM4-Privacy whether users’ personal information is protected Yes Yes
UM5-Security whether of the application protects information in depends on the
the system against security threats hosting system
Table I: Usability metrics. Given that this is an estimate of the performance of the designed system, we only use two degrees
‘high’ and ‘low’ to indicate the estimated degree. We omit the time metric due to lack of information about performance
aspects.
1) Disclosure of a Post: The owner provides values for the
various CAP, such as post attributes and the audience. The
context inference layer infers the context. The interpretation
layer infers a set of relevant interpretations. CPML prompts
the owner with the set of possible interpretations to specify the
appropriate interpretation—in case it follows an access control
approach. In case it follows an accountability and auditing
approach, CPML saves the inferred interpretations from the
original context, or can also allow the user to specify the
appropriate interpretation for accuracy.
2) Context Evolution: CPML checks changes in context
and allows only those that continue to preserve the appropri-
ateness of data interpretation. The change is simulated so that
the context inference layer and interpretation layer infer the
context and the interpretation after the change. Based on the
appropriateness of the interpretations of all posts in the new
context, CPML either allows the change, or prohibits it, in
case it follows an access control approach. If the change will
misappropriate the interpretation of any post and if CPML
follows an accountability and auditing approach, it notifies
the relevant owners to judge the appropriateness in the new
context.
3) Recontextualisation: When a post is added to a situation,
CPML interacts with the interpretation layer to infer the post
interpretation in the new context. If the new interpretation has
not been specified as appropriate by the owner of the post, the
recontextualisation is prohibited. If an accountability approach
is followed, the owner can judge the appropriateness.
Upon any misappropriation attack, the framework would be
able to detect the misappropriation and prohibit it, or consult
the attacked user.
A. Enhancing Communication
In the following we present how CPS2 is needed to enhance
privacy management in adversarial communication.
In scenario 1, the manipulated interpretation of the photo
through the recontextualisation makes the communication
adversarial. This type of adversarial communication can be
mitigated by CPS2 without having to adopt other strategies
such as social stenography, which is demonstrated in this
scenario reported by Boyd [27]:
Scenario 7 Carmen was sad because she broke up with her
boyfriend. She wanted to express that to her friends but not to her
mother so that she would not worry. Carmen posted lyrics from
“Always Look on the Bright Side of Life” from the film “Life of
Brian”, where the main character is about to be killed. She knew that
some of her friends would infer her exact communicated message,
while her mother would infer a literal meaning of the post.
This scenario reflects how users adopt particular strategies
when they are unable to control context or want to avoid
investing time and effort in restricting the audience [28].
Carmen keeps the context ambiguous and chooses to disclose
a post that has two interpretations so that the correct
interpretation is not inferred by all the members of the
audience. By doing so, she misleads those in the audience
who believe she is truly happy when they are unaware of the
actual context. The interpretation can be disambiguated based
on the audience’s knowledge with the film and the online
context. This way, the post can be correctly perceived by the
friends but not the mother.
The approach of Carmen is referred to as social steganog-
raphy [27]. It is based on manipulating the interpretation
to only convey it correctly to the appropriate audience. It
is convenient for users who are faced with the complexity
of privacy management approaches. It is also similar to the
concept of CPS2, yet, insufficient for contextual privacy man-
agement: any of Carmen’s friends could comment in a way that
reveals an interpretation that Carmen does not want to make
explicit. Another problem with this approach is that it obstructs
communication. The deliberate interpretation ambiguity may
lead to ineffective communication It also involves the risk
of inappropriate behaviour by the audience who are unable
to perceive the intended interpretation. However, CPS2 is
required to avoid such consequences of social steganography,
and to manage privacy more effectively.
VI. RELATED WORK
Various works realise the importance of context in pri-
vacy management. However, most approaches lack the dy-
namic adaptivity to changes in context [6] by simplifying
the representation of context. In the access control model
proposed by Fong [29], relationships represent contexts. The
context is approximated by relationships between the audi-
ence and the owner, regardless of the type and semantics
of the posts they are communicating about. The contextual
privacy approaches based on Nissenbaum’s work [25] also
simplify the representation of context to avoid the prohibitive
complexity of specifying details in advance [7]. Simplifying
context representation has many shortcomings. In the case
of representing context by means of roles, the process is
ineffective and time consuming. Users are not willing to invest
time in such a process [30]. However, artificial intelligence can
be used to address the challenge of assigning roles to users
by utilising clustering algorithms [31]. Yet, empirical studies
with Facebook users show that grouping friends in a set of
classes or roles is not relevant to privacy management [32].
Thus, approaches like ours are needed to simplify contextual
privacy management, and achieve a higher degree of privacy
and effective communication.
VII. CONCLUSION
Context is an essential ingredient for communication and
privacy management. This article emphasises the role of
context in interpreting posts and privacy management. By
managing contextual privacy through managing the interpreta-
tion of posts, users could manage their privacy without being
faced with the complexity of controlling context. The proposed
architecture design using intelligent mechanisms is promising
for addressing the complexity of controlling context, and
enhancing communication. It is promising for offering social
software experience while having privacy preserved in private
and public spaces with a relatively high degree of usability, as
well as offering other functionalities related to feedback and
awareness.
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